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This paper studies the relationship between bilateral trade patterns and opinions. It uses the
Eurobarometer public opinion surveys published by the European Commission, which provide data on the
share of the population in each EU15 member country in favour of each CEEC joining the EU. Our results
first suggest that bilateral opinions have a statistically robust and relatively large effect on imports, even
when standard and new covariates capturing proximity between countries are controlled for. We interpret
this effect as reflecting a positive impact of “bilateral affinity” on trade patterns. We also show that it is
possible to go some way towards explaining the variance in bilateral opinions among our sample. Last we
provide some preliminary attempt to determine causality between bilateral opinions and imports.
© 2006 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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1. Introduction
Proximity helps exchanges. This has been an enduring result in the literature since the
gravitational law has been proposed by economists as a description of bilateral commodity flows.1⁎ Corresponding author. Tel.: +33 1 44 08 72 72; fax: +33 1 44 08 16 63.
E-mail address: disdier@inapg.fr (A.-C. Disdier).
1 Tinbergen, 1962, is often cited as the original study of this kind, but Isard and Peck, 1954, is an earlier study using
gravity determinants of trade flows. Hundreds of papers have used the gravity model empirically since then.
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ARTICLE IN PRESSMore debate emerges when it comes to what is a good definition of proximity. Physical distance
should clearly enter this definition and always does, usually motivated as a proxy for transportation
costs. This primary (inverse) measure of proximity still matters a great deal in trade patterns: In a
meta-analysis on the impact of distance on bilateral trade, Disdier and Head (in press) report an
average elasticity estimate of −0.91, covering 1467 estimates in 103 studies. They also show that
estimates are in fact rising over time since the 1950s, a result arguing against naive expectations
about the current level of globalization.
More generally, the impact of proximity on trade can be divided into two components: The
reduction of transaction costs (freight, but also communication and information costs) and bilateral
affinity between the two countries (which notably influences preferences of consumers). This affinity
is itself generated by a complex mixture of exogenous “historical accidents” (good or bad) that arose
between the two countries, and more endogenous economic characteristics of the two countries.
Physical distance is clearly an imperfect and incomplete measure of this overall definition of
proximity. First, some elements of transaction costs are not directly related to distance (variations
in bilateral protectionist measures have no a priori reason to follow distance in a systematic way
for instance). Second, bilateral distance has all chances to be a poor measure of bilateral affinity.
Consider the example of cultural traits. We have all reasons to believe that countries sharing
similar cultural features have i) more proximate tastes, ii) lower communication and information
costs and iii) more trust that individuals in the other country will not adopt an opportunistic
behaviour in contractual relationships as Guiso et al. (2004) emphasize. All of those will
contribute to make trade larger. Cultural proximity is likely to be correlated with physical
distance, for the simple reason that a lot of cultural features travel embodied in people, and that
migrations are strongly impeded by distance. It is however imperfectly captured by distance.
Empirical support for this view can be found in the literature about network effects in
international trade. This body of work recently surveyed in Rauch (2001) and Wagner et al.
(2002), has repeatedly found that bilateral migration is a robust trade-promoting force, even after
controlling for bilateral distance. The very robust and large positive impact on trade flows of
common language and colonial links that are routinely introduced in gravity equations, is a further
sign that cultural aspects of proximity are important in international commerce, in addition to
distance. We use here a new type of information, the bilateral opinions expressed by surveyed
populations in European Union 15 (EU15) member countries about the enlargement to Eastern
European countries, to capture more precisely the impact of proximity on trade patterns.
Bilateral opinions are of course themselves not random. They are affected by a host of different
elements that we will investigate here, some of them stemming from non-economic characteristics
of the two countries, some of them deeply affected by the endogenous economic environment,
particularly in our case where the question asked relates to the desirability of enlargement and
therefore of international integration with a specific trade partner. The intensity of trade flows is
likely to be one of those economic determinants of bilateral opinions. We can refer to this
influence as the “non-traditional” effects of trade. The relationship between trade patterns and
bilateral affinity has rarely been studied in the literature (Guiso et al., 2004 being a recent
exception). Several channels can be envisioned to the impact of trade on opinions, one stipulating
that large trade volumes help diffuse information and cultural traits, reduce bilateral ignorances
and fears, which might translate in better bilateral opinions everything else equal. A reverse
argument can however also be used. Opinions can be guided by fears of strengthened competition
with the entry of candidate countries. A large bilateral trade volume can thus yield an overall
lower level of positive opinions under this view, reflecting demand for protection. This
phenomenon is likely to be all the more important that the two countries are specialized in thePlease cite this article as: Disdier, A.-C., Mayer, T. Je t'aime, moi non plus: Bilateral opinions and international trade.
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ARTICLE IN PRESSsame industry, in which case expectations of large adjustment costs following the enlargement are
high.2 This is emphasized in a recent and related work by Mayda and Rodrik (2005), who find
using individual data that the demands for protectionism are significantly higher in industries
most exposed to foreign competition. Regarding our sample of countries, note that the number of
anti-dumping investigations conducted by EU against CEECs has significantly increased at the
end of the 90s. The number of anti-dumping initiations registered only started to decrease
substantially in 2002.3
While our opinion data are not available at the individual level, as in Mayda and Rodrik (2005)
they have the advantage of having a bilateral dimension (and also a – short – temporal one). We
use these data to investigate the relationship between trade integration and bilateral opinions in
both directions. We therefore try to address the following questions: First, is there an influence of
opinions on bilateral trade, even after controlling for often used proximity variables? Second,
what are the determinants of those bilateral opinions? We also investigate causality using the
drastic trade policy changes over the period as an instrument for trade volumes.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. The related empirical literature is
presented in Section 2. The data are described in Section 3. In Section 4 we present our
specification and report the results from the contemporaneous correlation. The method used for
causality analysis and results of this analysis are detailed in Section 5. Section 6 concludes.
2. Related empirical literature
2.1. Bilateral affinity as a determinant of bilateral trade
Several forms of trade partners' bilateral affinity have been studied in the literature, with
different mechanisms of influence. Two measures have quite a long history in the gravity equation
literature: linguistic similarity and past colonial links.
International trade tends to be promoted by the linguistic proximity of countries. This finding
most often uses the simplest possible measure, a dummy variable set to one when the two
countries speak the same language. A typical estimate for this variable is 0.5 (Frankel, 1997 for
instance), which means that sharing a language increases trade flows by around 65%. Boisso and
Ferrantino (1997) and Melitz (2003) have investigated continuous measures of linguistic
similarity and showed that bilateral trade tends to decrease with the linguistic distance. Junius and
Nitsch (2001) also investigate the impact of language on trade through the inclusion of a bilateral
ethno-linguistic fragmentation variable in a gravity study. They find that the product of ethno-
linguistic fragmentation of partner countries has a positive impact on trade and interpret this as
evidence of the importance of cultural proximity in reducing search costs.
Colonial links have also been shown to be trade-enhancing. Several channels can again be
envisioned. First, colonizing powers have usually established trade networks in the colonized
countries and those networks can persist even after the colonial episode.4 Second, being
colonized often involves adoption of the institutional framework of the colonizer (with some2 The adjustment costs will be particularly strong in a Heckscher–Ohlin framework where trade liberalization may
eliminate an entire sector. In an imperfect competition–love of variety model, the costs will be lower. We thank one of the
two referees for this remark.
3 3 new investigations were initiated in 1996, 5 in 1997, 6 in 1998, 8 in 1999, 6 in 2000, 7 in 2001, and 1 in 2002. Since
2003, no new investigation has been initiated. Source: European Commission, DG Competition website.
4 The importance of formal and informal networks in international trade has been recently emphasized (see Rauch,
2001, for an overview of this literature).
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ARTICLE IN PRESSvariance depending on the colonizer and the colonized country as emphasized by Acemoglu et al.,
2001). Such institutions involve legal rules and administrative systems that can affect the ease of
international trade through an improvement in the security of transactions or a reduction in
communication costs due to similarity in the institutional framework. Note that this can explain
why an ancient colony still trades more than expected5 with its ex-colonizer, but also why two
countries having had the same colonizer have larger than expected bilateral trade flows. Rose
(2000) has implemented this using dummies for historical colonial links and for the fact that the
two countries have had the same colonizer. The impacts found are extremely large. In
his benchmark results for 1990, the colonial relationship raises bilateral trade by a factor of exp
(1.75)=5.75, everything else equal, while having had a common colonizer make countries'
bilateral trade exp(0.59)−1=80% larger. It is interesting to note also that those coefficients were
substantially larger for the year 1970.6
Linked to this literature is the body of work studying the existence of business and social
network effects in trade, through the estimation of the explanatory power of international
migrations patterns on bilateral trade. Wagner et al. (2002) provide a comparison of this set of
papers analysing the immigration–trade link. Immigrants promote exchanges between their origin
and host countries in two major ways. The first one works through a diffusion-of-tastes channel,
since immigrants keep at least part of their preference for goods produced in their origin country,
and might also yield some locals to acquire tastes of immigrants on a certain number of goods.
Immigrants also bring with them additional information about trade opportunities and demand
characteristics in their origin country, which entails a reduction in transaction costs. The empirical
results often find robust and large estimates for both the impact of immigration on imports and
exports linkage, providing support for the information channel, at least as much as for the
diffusion of preferences' one.
Last and most related to our work, is the very recent paper by Guiso et al. (2004) on bilateral
trust and economic exchanges. They use the Eurobarometer survey, as we do here, but they rely
on answers to a different question, the one about the level of bilateral trust between citizens of
different countries. Their main argument is that bilateral trust is built in each country through a
process in which cultural biases are important, and those later influence bilateral economic
relationships. Indeed, lack of bilateral trust makes people reluctant in starting a contractual
relationship, which in return forbids the level of knowledge of potential partners in the other
country to increase, and hence trust can never reach a level where trade or investment is expected
to be profitable. Introducing this variable in bilateral trade and FDI equations, they find a robust
positive impact of trust on trade flows, less so on FDI.
2.2. The determinants of opinions
How are bilateral opinions determined? The existing literature has used as dependent variables
individual level opinions on the protectionist sentiment (Mayda and Rodrik, 2005; O'Rourke and
Sinnott, 2006) and on the will in candidate countries to enter the EU (Doyle and Fidrmuc, 2006).5 Expected in the sense of predicted by the gravity equation, i.e. given the economic sizes of both trade partners and the
distance between them.
6 Eichengreen and Irwin (1998) also illustrate this influence. Their research on bilateral trade between countries of the
former British Empire and of the British Commonwealth, between the United States and the Philippines, and between the
Netherlands and the Indonesia for the years 1949, 1954 and 1964 confirms that these colonial links have a significant
influence on trade.
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ARTICLE IN PRESSThey therefore only have information on “non-dyadic opinions”which they try to explainwith “non-
dyadic opinions” determinants.
A large number of such determinants have been proposed in those papers. They refer to the
economic characteristics of countries and individuals (using essentially information on endowments
and industries) and to the non-economic perceptions by citizens. Our research is here closely related
to the one by Mayda and Rodrik (2005) on the determinants of individual opinions in relation to
international trade. Several results are of direct interest for our work. First, people with a high level of
education and skill disagree strongly with trade restrictions only if their country is human capital
abundant. Besides, the degree of trade openness of the sector in which an individual is employed
seems to influence his opinion. People belonging to non-traded sectors are more in favour of
international trade. Among the traded sectors, individuals in sectors with a comparative disadvantage
are more protectionist. A positive relation exists also between the social status – either defined in
terms of relative income or the subjective perception of it – and opinions in favour of international
trade. Last, these individual opinions are significantly influenced by various non-economic elements:
everything else equal, individuals strongly attached to their neighbourhood and to their country are
more protectionists. On the other hand, those who have greater confidence in political and economic
institutions appearmore open to international trade. Doyle and Fidrmuc (2006) study the results of an
opinion poll conducted inMarch/April 2002 inwhich citizens from 13 candidate countries in Eastern
Europe are asked whether they would vote for or against EUmembership in a referendum. They find
that a high level of education, youth, a relatively high income, and living in an urban area increases
the support for EU membership, while individuals who should benefit from the EU redistribution
system surprisingly do not support membership. Contrary toMayda and Rodrik (2005) or O'Rourke
and Sinnott (2006), Doyle and Fidrmuc (2006) however do not really consider whether the trade
theory predictions are backed up by opinions. Compared to this literature explaining opinions, we
have here a bilateral dimension in the data. For example, we know the percentage of Italians
supporting the enlargement to Bulgaria and the one in favour of the enlargement to Hungary. This
additional dimension allows analysis of new determinants, as will be clear below.
Guiso et al. (2004) attempt to explain how bilateral trust is built between two nations. They
also incorporate fixed effects for each of the two countries in the relationship to account for
nation-specific characteristics that do not vary over time and make a country more likely to trust
or to be trusted (its long term history of warfare for instance). Their main determinants of trust in
terms of significance are the commonality of legal origin, genetic distance, which probably
captures a common origin region of both populations, a common history, large population
exchanges…. The impact of a variable capturing the level of information (number of times the
name of the other country is cited in the newspapers) is negative when statistically significant,
which they interpret as a negative bias spread by newspapers when they talk about a country. The
data used by Guiso et al. (2004) have a bilateral dimension but their study does not include
economic determinants of trust. Our contribution can therefore be seen as an intermediate
between this type of analysis and the one about protectionist opinions seen above. We bridge the
two types of work by studying bilateral opinions about economic integration.
3. Data
Our empirical implementation uses annual data for European countries (14 EU countries and
10 Applicant countries). We have data for seven years: 1992, 1994, and from 1997 to 2001.
Separated statistical series for Belgium and Luxembourg have been unavailable until recently
(notably on trade flows), we exclude Luxembourg from the sample of opinions, its weight in thePlease cite this article as: Disdier, A.-C., Mayer, T. Je t'aime, moi non plus: Bilateral opinions and international trade.
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ARTICLE IN PRESStrade flows of Belgium–Luxembourg is usually very low. Besides, Austria, Finland and Sweden
are considered in the survey only since their membership and therefore only appear in our sample
starting in 1997. The ten CEECs are Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania,
Slovakia, Slovenia, and the three Baltic States, namely Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. For
concision purposes, data sources and descriptive statistics are given in the Appendix. A
correlation matrix is also available upon request.
Bilateral trade data – between each EU country and each CEEC – consist in aggregate flows.
In order to uncover potential differences depending on the direction of the trade flow, the
relationship between trade and opinions is studied separately for imports and exports. Our
measure of opinions is extracted from the Eurobarometer public opinion surveys published by the
European Commission. These biannual surveys have been conducted since 1973 in each Member
State. They present an analysis of public opinion towards the European Union (European
institutions, enlargement, support for European construction, etc.). An identical set of questions is
asked to representative samples of the population aged fifteen years and over in each Member
State. All interviews are face-to-face in people's home and in the appropriate national language.
The regular sample consists of 1000 people per country with some exceptions.7 Our measure of
opinions is based on the following question:7 Cur
Ireland
Pleas
EuroFor each of the following countries, would you be in favour of or against it becoming part
of the European Union?Countries cited in the list are the 10 applicant CEECs, Cyprus, Malta, and (according to the
year of the survey) Turkey, other Eastern European countries (e.g. Albania, Bosnia and
Herzegovina, Croatia) and Western European countries (Iceland, Norway, Switzerland, and –
before their membership – Austria, Finland and Sweden). For reasons of sample homogeneity,
our empirical implementation covers only the ten CEECs. All of them were indeed transition
countries at the beginning of the 90s and have recently joined (or will join in the next months for
Bulgaria and Romania) the European Union. Possible answers are “In favour”, “Against”, “Don't
know”. Results are expressed as a percentage of the total of the answers. The definition of our
opinion variable is based on the percentage of positive answers. In the estimations, these values
are drawn into the interval [0;100]. Questions appearing in the Eurobarometer surveys are
however not asked at regular intervals. The availability of the chosen question for the evaluation
of opinions limits our analysis to the years 1992, 1994 and from 1997 to 2001. As previously
mentioned, the Eurobarometer surveys are conducted twice a year. However, our trade data are
available only on an annual basis. We therefore retain for each year the mean of the answers from
both biannual surveys.
Table 1 summarizes the opinions' data in each EU country. Statistics on the opinions in each
EU country are calculated for three groups of CEECs. These groupings follow the geographical
classification adopted by the CIA in its factbook. The first one (group A) includes countries from
Central Europe, namely the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia, and Slovenia; Baltic
States (Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania) constitute a group (group B) of their own; last, the two
South-Eastern European countries of our sample – Bulgaria and Romania – form the third group
(group C). For each group, the average opinion expressed in 2001 and variations of this opinion
for the sub-periods 1992–1997 and 1997–2001 are reported (in percentage points).rent exceptions are for Luxembourg (600), the United Kingdom (1000 in Great Britain and 300 in Northern
), and Germany (2000 people: 1000 in East Germany and 1000 in West Germany).
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Table 1
Opinions of EU citizens towards adhesion of CEECs (%)
Country Group A Group B Group C
Opinion in 2001 Δ01/97 Δ97/92 Opinion in 2001 Δ01/97 Δ97/92 Opinion in 2001 Δ01/97 Δ97/92
Austria 44.8 19.3 35.7 28.3 24 33.3
Belgium 43.4 46.6 −31.8 40.7 59.6 −34.5 37.5 44.3 −40.9
Denmark 62.2 6.8 50.4 70.3 −1.2 14.8 45.5 2.3 43.7
Finland 48 −2.7 60 5.2 34 −9.7
France 28.8 −11.8 −21.8 20.3 −13.5 −31.5 26 −16.1 −25.9
Germany 42.8 26.5 −19.4 41.3 41 −38 27.5 39.6 −39.7
Great Britain 38.6 −1.3 −16.9 33 −5.3 −9.1 35.5 −5.3 −11.7
Greece 62.6 12 36.9 57 17.5 50.1 61.5 7 16.3
Ireland 45.2 12.8 11.7 41 12.4 14.2 42 5.1 −5.9
Italy 49.2 9.6 −9.7 39.3 10.3 −8.5 46 9.5 −12.2
The Netherlands 48 −16.6 10.2 47.7 −10.9 −1.3 38.5 −19.8 9.2
Portugal 47 24.2 −10.4 42.3 26.4 −4.2 47.5 26.7 −25.8
Spain 51.2 6.3 −2.5 48 9.9 4 50.5 1.5 −1.5
Sweden 69.8 17.4 76.3 13.4 59.5 23.3
EU average 48.7 46.6 41.1
Notes: Group A: Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia, and Slovenia; group B: Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania;
group C: Bulgaria and Romania. Opinions and their variations are in %. These variations refer to the percentage change in
the opinion poll percentage.
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ARTICLE IN PRESSFirst, we note that the average support for enlargement varies depending on which country you
ask them should join (49% for group A, 47% for group B and only 41% for group C). Support for
enlargement varies also between Member States. Interestingly, people in Sweden, followed by
people in Greece and Denmark, tend to be most supportive. On the opposite, France and the
United Kingdom tend to have the least supportive opinions in 2001. This first pattern shows that
controlling for structural differences in the level of support in each Western European country and
also for the average level of support towards each CEEC will be crucial, and we will include
country-specific fixed effects as a consequence.
Fig. 1 provides two graphical descriptions of the distribution of public opinion favourable to
the enlargement in each EU country. These opinions are represented on the horizontal axis.
Panel (a) shows the level of opinions expressed in 1992, 1994, 1997 and 2001. EU countries areFig. 1. Evolution of opinions expressed in each EU country in favour of enlargement. (a) Time trend, (b) CEECs for which
opinions are the lowest and the highest.
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ARTICLE IN PRESSranked using the level of their opinions in 2001. Two facts seem noteworthy: First, some
countries are constantly more in favour of the enlargement than others. In particular, Denmark
and Sweden, followed by Greece, are among the highest supporters of the enlargement, for
almost all years. Second, opinions are not always improving over time. For all countries (except
Belgium), the level in 1994 is very similar to the one in 1992 or higher. This is however
followed by a strong reduction between 1994 and 1997. In 1997, opinions have deteriorated in
most countries (except in Denmark, Netherlands and Greece). Opinions in 2001 are better than
in 1997 for 9 countries of our sample and worse for the rest of them. Panel (b) shows for each
EU country, the CEEC for which average bilateral opinions over the whole time period of our
sample (7 years) are the smallest and the CEEC for which, these opinions are the highest. The
influence of geographical proximity appears clearly here: For example, all the Nordic countries
in our sample (Denmark, Finland and Sweden) have Estonia as their preferred joining member
for the enlargement.
4. Models and results
4.1. The influence of bilateral opinions on trade
Our theoretical foundation for trade patterns is the standard new trade monopolistic
competition–CES demand–Iceberg trade costs model first introduced by Krugman (1980) and
used by many since then. Producers operating under increasing returns in each country produce
differentiated varieties that they ship, with a cost, to consumers in all countries. Parameter ϕijt
measures the bilateral free-ness of trade between country i and country j in year t, involving both
actual price-raising trade impediments and the sensitivity of consumers to an increase in price.
The utility function used here contains a preference term aijt representing “bilateral love” of
consumers in j for varieties produced in i. The total value of exports from i to j in t can be written
in logs as (see Redding and Venables, 2004 for instance):
ln xijt ¼ lnðnitp1−rit Þ þ ln /ijt þ ðr−1Þln aijt þ lnðYjtPr−1jt Þ; ð1Þ
with nit and pit the number of varieties and prices in country i in t, Yjt and Pjt representing the
expenditure and price index of the importer country in t. The gravity equation can be seen as a
reduced form of this theoretical trade flow prediction, where the (logged) output of country i proxies
for the first term, and the (logged) income of j approximates the last one. Distance, common
language and contiguity are usually used for ln ϕijt+(σ−1) ln aijt. While nit pit1 − σ and YjtPjtσ − 1 are
not totally disconnected from the two GDPs of i and j respectively, they are crude approximations at
the best, raising issues on the validity of simple gravity specifications and results.
A specification more consistent with theory involves the use of fixed effects for each importer
and exporter (Hummels, 2001; Redding and Venables, 2004 use this method, notably
recommended by Feenstra, 2004). The fixed effects fei and fej incorporate the size effects as in
gravity, but also the other origin and destination determinants seen above, the price and the
number of varieties of the exporting country and the size of demand and the price index (often
referred to as a remoteness term) of the importing country:
ln xijt ¼ fei þ ln /ijt þ ðr−1Þln aijt þ fej: ð2Þ
We will therefore mostly use this specification together with simple gravity. Theory predicts
unitary income elasticities. Following Anderson and van Wincoop (2003), we impose an unitPlease cite this article as: Disdier, A.-C., Mayer, T. Je t'aime, moi non plus: Bilateral opinions and international trade.
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ARTICLE IN PRESScoefficient on income variables in the fixed effects estimations by dividing trade volumes by the
product of both partners' GDPs.
The last step is to specify free-ness of trade and bilateral preferences, ϕijt and aijt. Trade
costs that reduce ϕijt, are usually seen as consisting of transport costs, protection measures,
and information/communication costs (Anderson and van Wincoop, 2004). Bilateral distance
and common border are standard proxies for transport costs. Bilateral tariffs will be used here
(in the last part of the article) as a measure of trade policy. We use two variables to proxy for
information channels about profitable trade opportunities between the two countries. We first
use bilateral exchanges of newspapers, newsijt, as a proxy for the ease of communication and
quality of reciprocal information. Recent evidence on the impact of business and social
networks on trade patterns has also shown that migrants can boost international commerce
through different channels. One of the most important, according to empirical findings (Rauch
and Trindade, 2002 for instance) is the reduction of information costs related to international
trade.8
ln /ijt ¼ d1ln dij þ d2cbij−ðr−1Þln tarijt þ d3ln newsijt þ d4ln asylumij: ð3Þ
Distance (dij) between trade partners is defined as the sum of the bilateral distances between
the biggest cities of countries weighted by the economic size of those cities. City population is
used as weight. cbij is a dummy variable set to 1 for pairs of countries that share a common border.
asylumij is the share of asylum seekers going to a particular EU member during the period 1988–
1993. Note that data availability for migrations is relatively poor and some values of this variable
are missing.
Often, aijt is specified and simplified as a home bias, mostly because no bilateral
information on preferences is available to the researcher. One of our objectives in this paper is
to provide a richer specification of bilateral preferences. A first set of proxy variables identifies
characteristics that can make tastes of consumers more similar and hence augment the quality
of the match between varieties produced in i and tastes of consumers in j. A cultural similarity
variable that has been largely used and can proxy for similar preferences is common language.
Note that linguistic proximity is hard to measure in our sample: The introduction of a dummy
variable is indeed not appropriate because no single pair of countries shares a common
language in this sample. The use of a continuous measure of the linguistic distance between
countries as in Boisso and Ferrantino (1997) or Melitz (2003) is also hard: Similarity indexes
are available for an insufficient number of countries and/or only treat Indo-European
languages and therefore totally ignore the three Finno-Ugric languages also present in our
sample. We use a richer variable of proximity of languages spoken langij, that takes into
account the language “families” established by linguists and uses the product of the share of
populations speaking a specific language in each of the two trading partners. For each
language, we first consider its family and sub-family. For example, French and English are
Indo-European languages. Regarding their sub-families, French belongs to the Italic languages
and English to the Germanic ones. We then define a language similarity's index which takes
the value of 1 if both countries have the same language, 0.5 if the two languages belong to the8 Note that it has also been emphasized in the literature that the transmission of preferences to locals, or the reduction of
opportunistic behaviour between members of the social network of migrants can facilitate trade, and could possibly enter
the aij term here, making it hard to discriminate between the different channels of influence.
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Table 2
Influence of bilateral opinions on EU imports
Dependent variable ln imports ln (imports/product of GDPs)
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Intercept −9.62a
(1.11)
−11.65a
(1.01)
−12.17a
(1.07)
−10.09a
(0.85)
−11.58a
(1.20)
−11.85a
(1.21)
ln GDP EU country 0.96a (0.04) 0.99a (0.04) 1.01a (0.04)
ln GDP CEEC 0.72a (0.04) 0.70a (0.04) 0.72a (0.05)
ln distance −1.43a (0.09) −1.40a (0.09) −1.43a (0.10) −2.18a (0.12) −2.11a (0.13) −2.09a (0.14)
Common border 0.37b (0.16) 0.44a (0.16) 0.44a (0.16) 0.01 (0.11) −0.01 (0.12) −0.01 (0.14)
ln imports of newspapers 0.00 (0.01) 0.00 (0.01) 0.00 (0.01) −0.01 (0.00) −0.01 (0.00) −0.01 (0.00)
ln share asylum seekers 0.15a (0.02) 0.15a (0.02) 0.16a (0.02) 0.07c (0.04) 0.06c (0.04) 0.08b (0.04)
Language proximity index −0.37 (0.34) −0.26 (0.34) −0.34 (0.37) 1.18a (0.36) 1.05a (0.36) 0.94a (0.42)
ln imports of books 0.01 (0.01) 0.01 (0.01) 0.00 (0.01) 0.01c (0.01) 0.01b (0.01) 0.01 (0.01)
ln bilateral opinion 0.36a (0.11) 0.32c (0.18)
ln bilateral opinion
(lagged)
0.39a (0.11) 0.38b (0.19)
EU countries fixed effects No No No Yes Yes Yes
CEECs fixed effects No No No Yes Yes Yes
Time effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 679 679 585 679 679 585
R2 0.858 0.861 0.866 0.787 0.792 0.786
Note: Newey–West standard errors in parentheseswith a,b and c respectively denoting significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels.
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ARTICLE IN PRESSsame sub-family, 0.25 if the two languages belong to two different sub-families but to the same
family and 0 for two languages from two different families. Finally, the linguistic proximity
between two countries is calculated by adding, for all the languages spoken by at least 3% ofTable 3
Influence of bilateral opinions on EU exports
Dependent variable ln exports ln (exports/product of GDPs)
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Intercept −7.13a
(0.89)
−7.73a
(1.04)
−8.41a
(1.02)
−11.34a
(0.78)
−13.35a
(1.18)
−10.85a
(1.06)
ln GDP EU country 0.91a (0.04) 0.92a (0.05) 1.00a (0.05)
ln GDP CEEC 0.70a (0.03) 0.70a (0.03) 0.73a (0.04)
ln distance −1.64a (0.09) −1.63a (0.09) −1.70a (0.09) −1.98a (0.10) −1.88a (0.11) −2.00a (0.11)
Common border −0.16 (0.15) −0.14 (0.14) −0.11 (0.13) −0.10 (0.16) −0.13 (0.13) −0.06 (0.13)
ln exports of newspapers 0.02a (0.01) 0.02a (0.01) 0.01 (0.01) 0.01 (0.00) 0.01 (0.00) 0.00 (0.00)
ln share asylum seekers 0.10a (0.02) 0.10a (0.02) 0.10a (0.02) 0.02 (0.03) 0.02 (0.03) 0.02 (0.04)
Language proximity index −0.86a (0.32) −0.83b (0.33) −0.91a (0.35) 0.45 (0.32) 0.29 (0.32) 0.36 (0.36)
ln exports of books 0.02b (0.01) 0.02b (0.01) 0.01c (0.01) 0.02a (0.01) 0.02a (0.01) 0.02a (0.01)
ln bilateral opinion 0.10 (0.10) 0.42b (0.19)
ln bilateral opinion
(lagged)
0.08 (0.10) 0.07 (0.15)
EU countries fixed effects No No No Yes Yes Yes
CEECs fixed effects No No No Yes Yes Yes
Time effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 679 679 585 679 679 585
R2 0.896 0.896 0.912 0.847 0.848 0.862
Note:Newey–West standard errors in parentheseswith a,b and c respectively denoting significance at the 1%,5%and 10% levels.
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ARTICLE IN PRESSthe population in each country, the products of the shares of speakers in each country weighted
by the language similarity index. In addition, we control for the bilateral trade in printed books,
booksijt, that should also be related to common cultural traits and therefore similar tastes of
consumers.
ln aijt ¼ a1langij þ a2ln booksijt: ð4Þ
The next step is to introduce the bilateral opinions' variables in the trade equation. The
expected effect depends of course on how bilateral opinions are formed. As described in greater
details in the next section, we envision several determinants of bilateral opinions on the question
under study here. Opinions will reflect dimensions of both aijt and ϕijt. For instance, a long
history of violent warfare between i and j is likely to attach a negative image to all products
coming from the “ancestral enemy”, reducing aijt, but also to make communication and
negotiation of contracts more difficult, which reduces ϕijt. We therefore introduce the variable
opinijt, which measures the bilateral opinions, as described in a preceding section and have the
following expectations: 1) The impact on trade should be positive, 2) The impact should be larger
on imports than on exports because bilateral affinity has no reason to be strictly reciprocal,9
3) Variables proxying for aijt and ϕijt should see their influence reduced when they imperfectly
proxy for bilateral affinity, like for distance for instance.
Our preferred estimated equation is therefore:
lnðxijt=yityjtÞ ¼ fei þ fej þ d1ln dij þ d2cbij−ðr−1Þln tarijt þ d3ln newsijt
þ d4ln asylumij þ ðr−1Þa1langij þ ðr−1Þa2ln booksijt þ gln opinijt
þ eijt; ð5Þ
and we also present results from the “traditional”, simpler but mis-specified, gravity equation. In
this case, the log imports (ln xijt) are simply used as the dependent variable, fixed effects
are omitted and economic sizes of trading partners are measured with their respective real GDP
( yit and yjt). In our sample i=1,…, n is one of the candidate countries, and j=1,…, N is an EU
member (before May 1st, 2004). We also run estimations on xijt, the imports of candidate
countries from EU members during year t. Year dummies are introduced in all our regressions.
Results of the estimations are reported in Table 2 for imports and Table 3 for exports. The first
three columns of Tables 2 and 3 report results with simple gravity estimation. Fixed effects
estimation results – our preferred estimates – are reported in columns (4), (5) and (6). We
controlled for the presence of heteroscedasticity in all our estimations using the Breusch–Pagan/
Cook–Weisberg test. The presence of serial correlation in our panel regressions was also
investigated using the Wooldridge test. Results are available upon request, and suggest the
presence of both heteroscedasticity and serial correlation. We correct both problems using
Newey–West standard errors.
The overall high fit of regressions is consistent with what is found in the literature.
Regarding traditional covariates, the impact of distance is stronger than the usual estimates but
this comes from the fact that our sample mainly covers combinations of trading partners9 To take a well known example: Guiso et al. (2004) report that the level of bilateral trust between British and French
citizens is quite below the average level of trust those two countries inspire to other countries on average. What is more
unexpected is that the level of dis-trust of British citizens for French ones is more than twice the reverse level.
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ARTICLE IN PRESSinvolving ground transportation.10 Sharing a common border promotes EU imports from
CEECs in the gravity equation, but the effect is not robust, and is basically nil for exports to the
CEECs.
Column (2) of Table 2 introduces bilateral opinions in the simple gravity framework, and we
also account for a potential simultaneity bias between the changes in trade and bilateral opinions
by including the lagged value of bilateral opinion in column (3). Point estimates of the bilateral
opinion variable are quite stable across specifications. Elasticities revealed by coefficients of
columns (2), (3), (5) and (6) show that trade volumes rise by a value between 3.2 and 3.9%
following a 10% increase in bilateral opinion. This 10% increase corresponds for instance to a
4.42 percentage points rise, when considering the average value of the opinion variable (as can be
seen in the Appendix table). In our sample, a one-standard deviation increase (12.56 additional
percentage points of positive opinions) from the mean value amounts to a 28% rise, which raises
bilateral trade by a figure ranging between 9.3 and 11.3%. The magnitude of the effect is therefore
substantial in economic terms, in line with the estimates obtained by Guiso et al. (2004) with trust
as an explanatory variable, and highly statistically significant. Regressions also reveal that
bilateral opinions bring additional information in the explanation of trade patterns, rather than
substituting for the impact of other variables proxying ϕijt and aijt. Indeed, most of the variables
keep a stable coefficient with the inclusion of bilateral opinions in the gravity specification. Note
that the asylum seekers variable has a robust impact on trade flows and contributes substantially
to the overall fit of the regression. With the lowest estimates of Table 2, a one-standard deviation
increase from the mean of this variable raises bilateral trade by more than 11%. We also test if our
results are affected by our measure of migration. We use the stock of migrants from CEECs in EU
countries (available from the OECD international migration statistics) as an alternative measure of
migration. Results, available upon request, suggest a positive and statistically significant effect
of migration on trade and the influence of bilateral opinion on trade remains unchanged. The fit of
the regression is however slightly smaller. In the fixed effect specification, exchanges of
newspapers never have a significant positive impact on trade.11 Finally, language proximity
index, which was negative but not significant in the simple gravity estimations (columns 1 to 3),
becomes positive and significant in columns (4) to (6). One explanation for this reversal could be
that the unit coefficient imposed on income variables and the use of fixed effects affect the other
estimated coefficients and especially this linguistic index.
Comparing results from Tables 2 and 3, we see that our main variable of interest loses its
positive influence for exports in all except one estimations, which confirms priors if this
variable mostly reflects preferences of consumers. Opinions have no reason to reflect
systematically symmetrical bilateral affinity, and we do not have the information on opinions
of CEEC citizens on EU countries. The difference in coefficients can therefore be interpreted
as evidence that the underlying mechanism is indeed related to the affinity that consumers in
the importing country have for the exporting country. Opinions are overall significant and quite
large determinants of imports in our sample. Their influence is robust to the inclusion of other
proxies for similar preferences and low trade costs we use here, suggesting that it contains10 Disdier and Head (in press) find that distance estimates from gravity equations are substantially larger (in absolute
value) for intra-continental samples.
11 Note that due to time constraints, newspapers can also be directly printed in the host country, specially when the
potential readership is large there. However, we do not think that this is a significant concern in our case. Indeed, our
sample includes several small countries (in particular in Central and Eastern Europe) and the market for newspapers from
these countries does not seem large enough to make direct investment advantageous.
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ARTICLE IN PRESSadditional information on the bilateral affinity of countries that translates into higher trade
flows.
4.2. Determinants of bilateral opinions
The formation of opinions can be caused by two types of variables: the ones reflecting the
economic gains/losses expected by the population to arise from the enlargement and the ones
reflecting bilateral affinity. In addition, all our regressions include country-specific fixed effects
(in order to account for the unobservable systematic country-specific deviations in opinions), as
well as year dummy variables and a correction for heteroscedasticity and serial correlation.
Naturally, when explaining opinions with economic variables, the rationale and results of the
preceding section raise issues about endogeneity in general and reverse causality in particular. We
set aside this problem for now, but will return to it in Section 5.
Concerning the economic determinants of opinions, we first expect that high anticipated
costs of adjustment to the enlargement will translate into more negative opinions. We include
three types of variables to capture this determinant: trade flows divided by the product of
partners' GDPs in each direction, the difference in GDP per capita, and the difference in
unemployment rates between countries. The impact of imports is of particular interest here, as
a negative sign would provide support for the political economy explanation of opinion
formation, while a positive one would suggest that increased trade contributes to raise bilateral
affinity. Related, the current rate of unemployment might also contribute to fears of job losses
in the different member countries after the enlargement. The size of the EU country is also
taken into account, as it seems to be a crucial empirical determinant of the levels of opinions.
This variable can be justified with the well documented fact that large countries are less open to
international trade and investment. Net contributions to the EU budget might also matter,
although the sign of the effect is uncertain. The current level of aid received from the European
Commission under the regional policy programmes could generate negative opinions about the
enlargement, as enlargement might endanger those programmes and redirect them to the
CEECs. On the opposite, large net contributors might fear extended payments to be made to
the new entrants. We include net contributions divided by country's GDP as a covariate as well
as the amount of agriculture-related subsidies received (per farmer), which is often a key
political issue in European countries. Related to this is the overall perception by citizens of the
benefits their country enjoyed from membership. People might be more supportive of further
integration if they view the history of the EU to date as globally positive for their country. We
therefore include an additional question of the Eurobarometer survey on this topic:Pleas
Euro“Taking everything into consideration, would you say that (our country) has on balance
benefited or not from being a member of the European Union?”Possible answers are: “Benefited”, “Not benefited” or “Don't know”. We retain the percentage of
positive answers. Interestingly, this perceived benefit is in fact one of the most robust
determinant of positive opinions.
Opinions could also be influenced by affinity factors. One can think that bilateral affinity is
primarily constructed by the history of the dyad under consideration. Ancient alliances, intense
bilateral migration flows or repeated instances of political and/or cultural conflicts should
impact the feeling of citizens about each candidate countries. We use several proxies to capture
those historical ties likely to influence opinions. First, we use the number of military incidents
(warij) between the two countries within the period 1870–1989, and uncorrij which measurese cite this article as: Disdier, A.-C., Mayer, T. Je t'aime, moi non plus: Bilateral opinions and international trade.
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ARTICLE IN PRESSthe correlation between countries' positions during votes on resolutions in the General
Assembly of the United Nations. The UN votes correlation is intended to take into account
shorter term political proximity.12 As another proxy for cultural and historical ties, we also use
an index of religious proximity (religij), constructed in a very similar way as the language
similarity index.
Bilateral affinity can also be measured by variables used for trade costs and similarity of
preferences in the trade equation. A good example is our migration variable. It can capture an
information channel for profitable trading opportunities, but also bilateral affinity of each EU
country towards each acceding country. Indeed, during the “immediate transition period” (which
we date to be between 1988 and 1993 here), we expect asylum seekers trying to change
citizenship and move out of the Eastern Europe country considered to choose the EU country
where their chances of positive answer and then integration, success in professional and personal
life…are highest (see Hatton, 2004, for recent evidence). The share of asylum seekers going to a
particular EU member at this period should therefore reflect in part the bilateral affinity of
countries. We therefore include those variables for aijt and ϕijt as controls here.
The estimations of the influence of economic and affinity factors on bilateral opinions are
presented in Table 4. The dependent variable is the percentage of respondents in each Member
State that supports the enlargement to a given CEEC. These percentages belong to the [0;100]
interval. We take into account the existence of those upper and lower bounds of the explained
variable using a logistic transformation of the data (Greene, 2003).
The first four columns introduce imports and the following four exports. Columns (1) and (5)
present OLS results while the other ones report fixed effects estimates. Columns (4) and (8) include
lagged values of imports and exports. Imports always have a positive and significant influence in
statistical terms. For exports however, the effect is not significant when lagged values are used.
Besides, we note that the magnitude of the influence is higher for imports. As expected, introducing
additional controls for opinions, the influence of trade variables tends to decrease. Results indicate
that the difference inGDP per capita between the two countries has a negative effect on opinions. EU
citizens therefore have a better opinion concerning the membership of a candidate country when this
country is proximate in terms of development level. Note that proximity in income per capita seems
the key factor in this type of determinant, as suggested by the insignificance of the difference in
unemployment rates. Net contributions to the EU budget are positively associated with opinions
about the enlargement, which means that countries receiving the most from the EU have the worst
opinions about the enlargement. The fears of a reduction of EU subsidies seem to be a strong
determinant of opinions across countries. The agricultural subsidies variable (not reported here) has
however no significant influence, whereas the perceived benefit of the EUmembership has a strong
and positive influence on opinions. Regarding affinity variables, geographical proximity (short
distance), combined with high levels of political proximity, of linguistic affinity and of our asylum
variable is all positively associated with more positive opinions. Religious proximity has a negative
sign contrary to expectations. Finally, and unlike the estimations in the previous section, the R2 is
much higher when fixed effects are included in the regression. Bilateral economic and affinity
variables explain a proportion of EU citizens' opinions, but the crucial importance of fixed effects
points to a large influence of fixed characteristics of each country (EU members and CEECs).12 This measure is based on the roll-call votes. This form of vote happens when one Member State requests the recording
of the vote so that its stand, or the stand of another Member State, on the issue under discussion is clearly identified. This
recording must be requested before the voting is conducted. Data cover the period 1946–1996. We take the mean value of
annual correlation in the votes of the two trading partners between 1991 and 1996.
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ARTICLE IN PRESS5. Causality through trade policy
We have identified in the last two sections a reciprocal statistical relationship between
bilateral opinions and trade. Those results do however lack insights about the causal link inTable 4
Influence of economic and affinity factors on bilateral opinions
Dependent variable ln bilateral opinion
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Intercept 3.75a
(0.55)
18.95
(13.46)
−16.92
(26.71)
9.71
(34.49)
3.31a
(0.53)
16.15
(11.88)
−20.81
(26.93)
10.94
(35.74)
ln imports/product of GDPs 0.10a
(0.02)
0.13a
(0.01)
0.06a
(0.02)
ln imports/product of GDPs (lagged) 0.08a
(0.02)
ln exports/product of GDPs 0.08a
(0.02)
0.16a
(0.01)
0.05b
(0.02)
ln exports/product of GDPs (lagged) 0.04
(0.03)
ln population EU country −0.14a
(0.02)
−1.86
(1.57)
0.16
(2.91)
−3.04
(3.79)
−0.13a
(0.02)
−1.47
(1.37)
0.73
(2.94)
−3.01
(3.91)
ln GDP per capital difference −0.11c
(0.06)
−0.15a
(0.06)
−0.11c
(0.06)
−0.15a
(0.06)
ln unemployment rates difference 0.01
(0.01)
0.01
(0.01)
0.01
(0.01)
0.01
(0.01)
Net contribution to EU budget/GDP (%) 0.24a
(0.04)
0.16a
(0.04)
0.24a
(0.04)
0.17a
(0.04)
ln benefited from EC membership 0.66a
(0.11)
0.49a
(0.10)
0.66a
(0.11)
0.51a
(0.10)
No of conflict years −0.02b
(0.01)
−0.02a
(0.01)
−0.01b
(0.01)
−0.02a
(0.01)
ln UN vote correlation 3.71a
(0.75)
4.47a
(0.69)
3.48a
(0.75)
4.03a
(0.70)
Religion proximity index −0.30a
(0.12)
−0.33a
(0.10)
−0.35a
(0.12)
−0.37a
(0.11)
ln distance −0.32a
(0.07)
−0.27a
(0.06)
−0.34a
(0.07)
−0.36a
(0.07)
Common border 0.05
(0.08)
0.09
(0.08)
0.05
(0.08)
0.09
(0.08)
ln share asylum seekers 0.04c
(0.02)
0.03
(0.02)
0.04c
(0.02)
0.03c
(0.02)
ln imports of newspapers 0.00
(0.00)
0.00
(0.00)
0.00
(0.00)
0.00
(0.00)
Language proximity index 0.54a
(0.14)
0.54a
(0.12)
0.59a
(0.13)
0.60a
(0.13)
ln imports of books 0.00
(0.00)
−0.01a
(0.00)
0.00
(0.00)
−0.01a
(0.00)
EU countries fixed effects No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes
CEECs fixed effects No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes
Time effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 864 864 677 610 864 864 677 610
R2 0.152 0.843 0.897 0.927 0.137 0.858 0.899 0.922
Note:Newey–West standard errors in parentheseswith a,b and c respectively denoting significance at the 1%, 5%and 10% levels.
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ARTICLE IN PRESSthis relationship and its direction. We now turn to this question. This section will notably try
to use the drastic change in trade policy between the two parts of Europe during the transition
process as a way to assess whether the large rise in imports following this policy change did
impact the opinions in EU member countries. In order to go further than simple correlations, a
strategy is to estimate the impact of an exogenous change on trade flows on bilateral
opinions. Exogeneity signifying here that the change in trade volumes would themselves not
be caused by a change in opinions. Trade policy is generally not the ideal candidate for an
instrument. Tariffs (and trade policy in general) have been shown to be largely endogenous,
because of the response of governments to demand for protection inside the country (Trefler,
1993, is one of the most famous examples of empirical support of this hypothesis of
endogenous protection). In our case however, this concern has reasonable chances to be
irrelevant. Indeed, the change in trade policy from EU member countries was not dictated by
political economy considerations inside each country, but by the need to respond to the
external pressure for membership expressed by CEECs soon after the changes in political
regime. As Baldwin and Wyplosz (2003) recall, all CEECs expressed their will to enter the
EU in the early nineties. In response, the EU members offered a transition period in which
unilateral trade liberalization was a central element. We therefore have the uncommon
experiment of a uniform (across members because of the customs union nature of the EU) and
quite drastic fall in tariffs over that period, dictated by an unexpected and dramatic change in
the international environment, rather than a change in the demand for protection inside each
country, which might of course be affected by a change in opinions. There is an additional
dimension to this change: In 1995, Austria, Sweden and Finland joined the Union. At that
date, they adopted the common trade policy of the Union, which again constitutes a relatively
exogenous change from their formerly independent trade policy. Finally, note that some
variance in tariffs exists between CEECs, since association agreements were signed at
different dates.13
What about the instrumentation of opinions? Guiso et al. (2004) propose to use history of
war, commonality of religion and genetic distance as instruments for opinions (trust in their
paper). There are some problems with this approach however, linked to the fact that i) the
level of opinions is primarily determined by country-specific fixed effects, ii) their proposed
instruments seem to have little explanatory power on the levels of bilateral trust. We prefer to
use a first differences approach here that bypasses the problem of strong fixed effects
determinants in levels. Note however that identifying our effects solely on the time variation
of our data within pairs of countries is quite demanding, considering the small number of
years we have with fully available data. Also, the cross-sectional source of the relationship
between trade patterns and opinions, while badly suited to give insights about causality, is
interesting per se. We will provide IV regressions on first differences using what we consider
to be exogenous and robust determinants of opinions on the one hand (population, income per
capita difference, unemployment rates difference, net contribution to the EU budget, and the
perceived benefit from the EU). Concerning the evolution of bilateral trade, inspection of Eq.
(5) reveals that variation in bilateral tariffs is the main explanation for the ratio of trade over
the products of the two GDPs (exchanges of books and newspapers have very little time
variation). Due to missing observations for tariffs and in order to have relatively similar time13 March 1992 for ex-Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland, May 1993 for Romania, December 1993 for Bulgaria,
January 1995 for the three Baltic States, and January 1997 for Slovenia.
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ARTICLE IN PRESSperiods for regressions in first differences, we consider here only the years 1992, 1997 and
2001. Results are reported in Table 5.
Column (1) in Table 5 estimates the impact of bilateral opinions on trade volumes, using the
change in bilateral tariffs as the other determinant of the change in trade volumes. In column
(2), the change in bilateral opinions is explained by changes in the most significant explanatory
variables from the last section. Besides, this column introduces bilateral trade as an additional
determinant of changes in bilateral opinions. In column (1), the tariff variable has the expected
influence and coefficient close to those estimated in the literature. Results of column (2)
confirm expectations for the impact of changes in the population of EU country, perceived
benefits from the EU membership and aid received. Furthermore, both opinions and trade
variables are not significantly different from 0 in columns (1) and (2). This result reveals that
the relationships between trade and opinions from the preceding sections are in fact mostly if
not entirely due to cross-sectional variation. In the last two columns, we provide estimates of
IV regressions, in order to investigate the effect of more exogenous shocks to trade andTable 5
Bilateral opinions and EU imports — first differences
Model (1) (2) (3) (4)
Method OLS OLS IV IV
Dependent variable Δln (imp/GDPs) Δln opin. Δln (imp/GDPs) Δln opin.
Second step
Intercept 0.38a (0.05) −0.00 (0.03) 0.32a (0.08) −0.04 (0.05)
Δln tariff −5.96c (3.46) −7.15a (1.95)
Δln EU country population −3.90a (1.50) −4.91b (2.13)
Δln GDP/cap difference −0.09 (0.10) −0.17 (0.11)
Δln unempl. rates difference −0.00 (0.01) 0.01 (0.01)
ΔNet cont. to EU budget/GDP 0.12a (0.02) 0.12a (0.03)
Δln perceived benefit from EU 0.72a (0.06) 0.59a (0.09)
Δln bilateral opinion 0.05 (0.34) 0.89b (0.45)
Δln imports/product of GDPs −0.01 (0.02) 0.12 (0.08)
N 218 226 218 218
R2 0.048 0.500 0.073 0.150
Test of overidentifying restrictions
P-value reported (0.2704)
Dependent variable Δln opin. Δln (imp/GDPs)
First step
Intercept −0.00 (0.02) 0.38a (0.04)
Δln tariff −5.89c (3.14)
Δln EU country population −3.09b (1.48)
Δln GDP/cap difference −0.12 (0.09)
Δln unempl. rates difference −0.01 (0.01)
ΔNet cont. to EU budget/GDP 0.12a (0.02)
Δln perceived benefit from EU 0.67a (0.06)
N 248 218
R2 0.436 0.047
Note: Standard errors in parentheses with a,b and c respectively denoting significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels.
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ARTICLE IN PRESSopinions on each other in the within dimension studied here. We follow Easterly and Levine
(2003) and Acemoglu et al. (2001) and run two-stage least-squares regressions. For opinions,
we have the following equations:
Second stage : D ln ðopinijtÞ ¼ a½D ln ðxijt=yityjtÞ þ bXijt þ uijt
First stage : D ln ðxijt=yityjtÞ ¼ gXijt þ mijt
where Xij are exogenous variables. Similar equations are estimated for bilateral trade as a
dependent variable in the second stage. Instruments used for bilateral opinion and bilateral trade
are reported in the first-stage regressions (bottom of columns 3 and 4 respectively). If we focus
now on the results of the second-stage regressions, both coefficients of opinions and trade rise
when instrumented. Results suggest that an increase in bilateral opinions for a given pair of
country has a positive and significant impact on imports, when instrumented, whereas column
(1) reveals that the impact of opinions is not significant in the absence of instrumentation. The
influence of imports on opinions is never significant. Result of the overidentifying restrictions
test in column (3) confirms the validity of our instruments. Note that in column (4) there is no
overidentifying issue, as we have only one instrument. Finally, our results can be interpreted as
first evidence that the impact of a rise in opinions causes imports to increase, whereas a change in
imports has no measurable impact on opinions in the importing country. Caution is warranted
however in interpreting those results, due to the small sample size available here, notably
because of the combination of missing opinion and tariff data.
6. Conclusion
This paper studies the relationship between opinions in favour of the (then) upcoming
Eastern enlargement expressed by citizens in current EU countries and trade flows between
these two regions of Europe. We use data extracted from the Eurobarometer public opinion
surveys published by the European Commission, which allows to study bilateral patterns of
trade and opinions. Two central questions are investigated: First, do bilateral opinions and
trade flows move together even after controlling for the known forms of proximity existing
between two countries? Second, can we go further and assess in which direction does the
causality go?
Our results first suggest that bilateral opinions have a statistically robust and relatively large
effect on imports, even when standard and new covariates proxying for proximity between
countries are controlled for. This result holds both when using standard gravity equations and
fixed effects estimations. We interpret this effect as reflecting a positive impact of “bilateral
affinity” on trade patterns. The effect on exports is less significant and smaller in magnitude,
which supports our interpretation. We also show that it is possible to go some way towards
explaining the differences in bilateral opinions among our sample. We use several determinants,
based on proxies for affinity, and also on proxies suggested by trade theory and recent empirical
work that might explain why some countries are more reluctant to openness in general and with
some partners in particular. Finally we add country-specific effects. We show that those country
specificities are important, but that the economic determinants also seem to matter and in
particular bilateral imports which are positively associated with a good opinion about
enlargement. Last we provide a first pass at a causality analysis, which in the case of our
sample, shows a stronger impact of bilateral opinions on imports than the reverse.Please cite this article as: Disdier, A.-C., Mayer, T. Je t'aime, moi non plus: Bilateral opinions and international trade.
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Appendix A
Table A1
Descriptive statistics on variables of interestVariablePlease cite this article as: Disdier, A.-C., M
European Journal of Political Economy (Sourceayer, T. Je t'aime, moi non pl
2007), doi:10.1016/j.ejpoleco.Meanus: Bilateral
2006.09.021Std. dev.opinions anMin.d internationMax.Bil. opinion (% in favour of enlargement) Eurobarometer 44.26 12.56 13 77
EU imports (millions USD) Eurostat 543.38 1398.52 0.001 12,963.85
EU exports (millions USD) Eurostat 665.32 1606.23 0.009 13,681.27
GDP EU countries (millions USD) World Bank 599.95 615.23 53.65 2144.48
GDP CEECs (millions USD) World Bank 35.32 40.87 4.23 176.26
Distance (km) CEPII 1457.44 663.07 59.62 3311.85
Common border CIA factbook 0.05 0.23 0 1
Population of EU countries (thousands) World Bank 27,908.54 26,120.22 3557 83,030
Unemployment rate in EU countries (%) Eurostat 8.54 3.87 2.50 23.90
Unemployment rate in CEECs (%) Eurostat 10.95 4.34 2.30 20.20
EU imports of newspapers (USD) COMTRADE 125.94 830.50 0 13,208.38
EU exports of newspapers (USD) COMTRADE 394.11 2043.68 0 27,016.63
EU imports of books (USD) COMTRADE 674.41 1992.97 0 21,243.94
EU exports of books (USD) COMTRADE 1157.81 3118.38 0 24,556.17
Asylum seekers (%) Eurostat 11.84 22.31 0 100
Stocks migrants (%) Eurostat 11.97 26.83 0 98.22
Language proximity index www.ethnologue.com 0.18 0.10 0 0.46
Religion proximity index Encyclopedia Britannica 0.38 0.20 0.07 0.84
No. of conflict years Correlates Of War database
(http://cow2.la.psu.edu)
2.07 3.31 0 12UN vote correlation Gartzke et al. (1999) 84.93 7.31 66.20 98
Net contribution to EU budget/GDP (%) European Commission −0.67 1.50 −5.26 0.64
Perceived benefit from
EU membership (% benefited) Eurobarometer 54.58 17.01 21 90
Bilateral tariff (%) TRAINS 1.30 1.08 0.00 6.13References
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